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“ALL (POOR) LIVES MATTER”: HOW CLASS-NOT-RACE LOGIC  
REINSCRIBES RACE AND CLASS PRIVILEGE 
Jonathan P. Feingold1 
INTRODUCTION 
In An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scrutiny, Professors Devon 
Carbado and Kimberlé Crenshaw infuse affirmative action with an overdue 
dose of intersectionality theory. Their intervention, which highlights the 
disfavored remedial status of Black women, exposes equality law as an 
unmarked intersectional project that “privileges the intersectional identities of 
white antidiscrimination claimants.” 
This latent racial privilege rests on two doctrinal pillars. First, single-axis 
tiers of scrutiny, which force claimants and courts to view discrimination in 
either/or terms (that is, race-based or gender-based or class-based), contravene 
intersectionality’s core insight that “people live their lives co-constitutively as 
‘both/and,’ rather than fragmentarily as ‘either/or.’” Equal-protection doctrine, 
we might say, is “intersectionality-blind.”  
Second, intersectional blindness exists alongside colorblindness—a racial 
ideology hostile to race-conscious remedies. This pairing yields an equality 
regime that favors intersectional subjects whose racial identity is decoupled 
from their disadvantage (e.g., poor whites) and those who reap racial 
advantage through the daily churn of ostensibly neutral “market forces” (e.g., 
class-privileged whites).  
In this Essay, I draw upon An Intersectional Critique but shift the focus 
from race and gender to race and class. Specifically, I refocus the intersectional 
lens on an ongoing site of contestation: the argument that universities should 
consider an applicant’s socioeconomic class but not her race—what I refer to 
herein as “class-not-race” reforms. I make the class-race turn for three reasons. 
First, we are witness to unrelenting wealth disparities and their searing 
impact. The growing fissure between haves and have-nots exacerbates the 
increasingly steep cost of university membership (itself a key to social 
mobility). This tension calls on us to reckon with the causes and consequences 
of class stratification. But wealth gaps have never been race neutral. If 
anything, the ongoing pandemic and the economic crisis that followed throw 
into sharp relief the thread that binds race and class (and life chances) in 
 
1 Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law; B.A., Vassar College; J.D., 
UCLA School of Law. Many thanks to Jerry Kang for feedback on a prior draft. My 
thanks as well to the editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their superb 
edits and feedback, and to Sean Hickey for research assistance that supported this 
Essay. 
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America. This moment demands a serious intersectional class and race 
conversation.2 
Second, we are heading towards a world of class-not-race university 
admissions. Class-not-race policies already enjoy preferential status under 
existing law.3 Given the Supreme Court’s rightward turn since Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin (2016), it is easy to imagine a future in which this 
preference becomes a mandate.  
Third, and my focus herein, class-not-race logic ultimately serves neither 
poor whites nor people of color. To be sure, economically disadvantaged 
students enjoy certain benefits under admissions regimes that attend to class 
(relative to ones that do not). It is also true that poor whites, whose racial 
identity neither compounds nor deepens their class disadvantage, are often 
favored intersectional subjects under class-not-race frameworks. But in 
meaningful respects, the modest racial privilege enjoyed by poor whites only 
masks how class-not-race constitutionalism fortifies structural and 
institutional arrangements that keep those on the top at the top, and those on 
the bottom—poor whites included—at the bottom. In so doing, equality law 
commits the ultimate intersectionality sin: reinforcing structural hierarchies. 
I.   Class-Not-Race: The Supreme Court’s Preferred Approach 
Class-not-race reform enjoys preferential status within constitutional 
doctrine and, often, public discourse. As a matter of doctrine, this preference 
operates across and within tiers of scrutiny.4  
To begin, racial classifications are subject to the most demanding tier of 
judicial review: strict scrutiny. Class-conscious policies, in contrast, are subject 
to the least demanding tier of judicial review: rational basis review. In other 
words, the law is most hostile to race-conscious policies (even those also 
attentive to class) and most deferential to class-conscious policies (unless they 
also employ racial classifications). 
 
2 Cf. Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1593, 1635 (2011) 
(“While the CRT literature on intersectionality and gender is far from complete, it is 
much more robust than the CRT literature on intersectionality and class.”). A focus on 
class and race need not displace other axes of identity. To the contrary, 
intersectionality theory encourages a dynamic conversation attentive to how axes of 
identity and structures of power interact.  
3 See Part I. 
4 Within this Essay, I focus on the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment equal-
protection jurisprudence. The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private 
universities, such as Harvard, which are governed by Title VI. These two legal regimes 
are not identical. See Kimberly West-Faulcon, Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions 
of Black Bonus, 64 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 590 (2017) (discussing disparate-impact 
standards under Title VI regulations). Nonetheless, parties and courts often transport 
the constitutional framework to Title VI challenges. See, e.g., Students for Fair 
Admissions, Inc. v. Harvard, 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 189, 195–96 (D. Mass. 2019).  
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A second-layer preference exists within strict scrutiny itself. When subject 
to strict scrutiny, a defendant must establish that its race-conscious policy is 
“narrowly tailored”—a demand that requires, among other elements, the 
absence of  “race-neutral alternatives.” In the admissions context, litigants and 
Justices often argue that class-not-race policies offer such alternatives.  
As a matter of doctrine and policy, “[t]his formulation conceives of 
considerations of class as possible, and even preferable, substitutes for race-
conscious affirmative action policies.” As a practical matter, the doctrine 
incentivizes universities to either avoid or dilute any race-conscious 
components of their admissions regimes.5 Moreover, the suspect status of all 
racial classifications—even those designed to desegregate our schools or 
counter institutional legacies of racial exclusion—communicates that 
antiracism is itself racist.6 In effect, and as I describe further below, this 
constitutionalized class-not-race preference produces favored and disfavored 
intersectional racial subjects. 
II.   Original Sin: Intersectional Blindness 
We might consider intersectional blindness equality law’s original 
intersectionality sin. Just as colorblindness trivializes (if not denies) the 
ongoing relevance of race and racism, intersectional blindness betrays the 
interactive nature of our identities (e.g., race and class) and structures of power 
(e.g., racism and capitalism).7  
In the admissions context, intersectional blindness facilitates the 
presumption that one can cleanly disentangle an applicant’s race and class. 
Put slightly differently, class-not-race “arguments obscure the fact that race 
and class are coconstitutive yet distinct.” As a result, equality law overlooks 
the many ways in which class is raced and race is classed. 
A.  When Class Is Raced 
To say that class is raced is to suggest, at a minimum, that race mediates 
the class experience of individuals and groups. This dynamic manifests in 
multiple forms. Here, I address two: class mobility and class meaning.8 
 
5 See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (describing 
the University of Texas’s consideration of applicant race a “factor of a factor of a 
factor”). 
6 Or in the words of Chief Justice Roberts: “The way to stop discriminating on the basis 
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
7 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1, 79 (2019) (“Racial categories were invented to construct and maintain a white 
supremacist regime built on racial slavery and capitalism, and those categories 
continue to help govern systems in which racism has become embedded.”). 
8 These examples are not exhaustive. For a more comprehensive review, see, e.g., 
Harris, Fisher’s Foibles; john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional 
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1.  Class mobility. 
For purposes of this Essay, I employ the term “class mobility” to capture a 
person’s (or group’s) abilities (1) to accumulate wealth, and thereby ascend 
class hierarchies, and (2) to maintain a higher class status once attained.9  
The relevant backdrop is well known. For much of this country’s history, 
legalized racism was weaponized to extract, hoard, and monopolize resources 
that catalyzed generations of white economic, political, and social capital 
accumulation. Redlining, for example, exemplifies how public policy facilitated 
the inequitable distribution of key resources; white communities got access, 
communities of color did not. But as Professor K-Sue Park has poignantly 
observed, the story of redlining transcends uneven resource distribution. It is 
also a story of racialized wealth creation. As Park describes, redlining 
“engineer[ed] the mass-production of a new form of property whose value 
derived precisely from the segregated landscape it produced—the suburban 
single-family home.”  
This legacy of racialized wealth accumulation transcends individuals and 
communities. It also implicates America’s most prestigious educational 
institutions—universities such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton—as profiteers 
that leveraged slavery (and racism more broadly) to finance, and literally 
construct, their educational empires.10  
Inseparable from this history, whiteness remains a valued asset in 
America. Proximity to it (and inclusion within it) grants access to 
opportunities, resources, and networks that fuel the acquisition and retention 
of wealth.11 It should be no surprise, therefore, that immigrant and ethnic 
communities have long asserted their “whiteness” to improve their social, 
legal, and economic standing.12  
Beyond wealth accumulation, whiteness also buffers against wealth loss. 
This dynamic has manifest in the racially uneven fallout triggered by the 
current pandemic. The 2009 financial crisis bred similar results. Importantly, 
this racial buffering transcends moments of acute societal economic decline. As 
one salient example, race predicts whether children—even those born to 
 
Perspective, 25 Law & Ineq. 355 (2007); Lisa R. Pruitt, The False Choice Between Race 
and Class and Other Affirmative Action Myths, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 981, 982 (2015). 
9 This definition is underinclusive, but sufficient for purposes of this Essay.  
10 See Craig Steven Wilder, Ebony and Ivy (2013). 
11 See Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993); Laura 
Gomez, Inventing Latinos 125 (2020); Neil Foley, The White Scourge: Mexicans, 
Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (1999) (“[Mexicans were] in the 
ethnoracial middle ground between Anglo Americans and African Americans, not 
white enough to claim equality with Anglos and yet, in many cases, white enough to 
escape the worst features of the Jim Crow South.”). 
12 See Ian Haney Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (2006); Gomez, 
Inventing Latinos 127 & n.104. 
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wealthy parents—maintain class status or suffer economic decline during their 
lifetimes.13  
2.   Class meaning. 
By “class meaning,” I refer to dominant narratives concerning class in 
America. Often, these narratives describe class status (who is poor) and explain 
economic inequality (why the poor are poor). On the surface, common class 
narratives are race-less. When we discuss the vulnerabilities of poverty (which 
burden the poor) or the privileges of wealth (which benefit the rich), we conjure 
a universalized class experience that transcends and, in ways underdescribes, 
racial identity. Yet if we push at all, race—and the conceptual work it 
performs—rises to the surface.  
Consider how race informs conceptions of the “deserving” or “undeserving” 
poor.14 This distinction is embodied by two phrases etched into the American 
vernacular: “working class” and “welfare queen.” Both terms are facially race 
neutral. Yet both are racially encoded and invoke divergent stories about 
poverty’s causes and prescriptions.  
“Welfare queen” conjures powerful associations between poverty, 
Blackness (Black womanhood, in particular), and social deviance.15 Professor 
Priscilla Ocen explains: “Black women have been viewed as an omnipresent 
danger through designation as sexually promiscuous, incompetent mothers 
and welfare queens who threaten society . . . their reproductive capacities are 
deemed to be the source of crime, dependency, and disorder.” This racialized 
class story has roots in the now-infamous Moynihan Report, which “suggested 
that Black women as mothers were responsible for a ‘tangle of pathology’ that 
engulfed the African-American community, spawning unemployment, 
criminality, out of wedlock births, poverty, and the like.” 
“Working class,” a term tethered to whiteness, offers a distinct picture of 
the poor and their plight. The term evokes industrious laborers who suffer 
class disadvantage in spite of their individual effort. Thus, whereas “welfare 
queen” (read: Black woman) depicts culturally deficient subjects undeserving 
of public assistance, the “working class” (read: poor whites) portrays an 
honorable community that deserves a leg up.  
 
13 See Raj Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An 
Intergenerational Perspective (2018) (link) (“[A] black child born to parents in the top 
quintile is roughly as likely to fall to the bottom family income quintile as he or she is 
to remain in the top quintile; in contrast, white children are nearly five times as likely 
to remain in the top quintile as they are to fall to the bottom quintile.”).  
14 See Khiara M. Bridges, The Deserving Poor, the Undeserving Poor, and Class-Based 
Affirmative Action, 66 Emory L.J. 1049, 1092 (2017) (“[T]he line between the deserving 
and undeserving poor has shifted to maintain black people on the undeserving side of 
the binary.”). 
15 Contrary to public perceptions, white Americans remain the largest beneficiaries of 
government assistance.  
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These legitimating myths do more than stigmatize Blackness and Black 
communities. They also buttress a white middle-class identity moored to ideals 
of independence, merit, and self-sacrifice. In this sense, our societal 
preoccupation with “welfare queens” does more than denigrate Black poverty. 
It also insulates the white middle-class from having to reckon with the 
indelible link between white wealth and anti-Black racism (and genocide, and 
internment, and conquest, the list goes on).  
B.   When Race Is Classed 
Racial stereotypes are embroidered into America’s cultural fabric. As with 
class narratives, racial stereotypes describe and explain racial hierarchy. 
Stereotypes also inform how we perceive and interact with racialized 
individuals and groups.16 Accordingly, when society associates race with 
socioeconomic status, the relevant racial stereotypes—in effect—classes race.  
Americans associate Blackness with poverty.17 Beyond informing how we 
treat individual people, this link also affects how we evaluate entire 
neighborhoods.  
A 2008 study from Professor Maria Krysan and colleagues is instructive.18 
Participants viewed one of thirteen videos, each of which depicted a 
neighborhood across five socioeconomic tiers and three racial compositions.19 
Notably, participants downgraded otherwise identical neighborhoods as the 
proportion of Black residents increased—racially disparate treatment that 
affected perceptions of property values and school quality. The researchers 
explain: “[N]eighborhoods with the exact same observable characteristics 
[were] presumed by Whites to be lower-quality neighborhoods simply because 
of the race of the residents.”20  
The foregoing discussion, albeit incomplete, explores the dynamic and 
layered relationship that binds race and class. Even this partial review reveals 
how intersectional blindness erases key dimensions of both. These erasures, 
when fused to colorblindness, fuel a constitutional scheme that privileges the 
experiences and remedial needs of white intersectional subjects.    
III.  Colorblind Intersectionality: Unmarked Racial Privilege 
“Colorblind intersectionality,” a term coined by Carbado, refers to 
“instances in which whiteness helps to produce and is part of a cognizable 
 
16 See Galen Bodenhausen & Kurt Hugenberg, Attention, Perception and Social 
Cognition, in Social Cognition: The Basis of Human Interaction (2009).  
17 See Maria Krysan et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Racial Beliefs and Residential 
Segregation, 5 Du Bois. Rev. Soc. Sci. Res. Race 1 (2008).  
18 See Krysan, In the Eye of the Beholder. 
19 See Krysan, In the Eye of the Beholder (racial composition was either (a) all white, 
(b) all black, or (c) racially mixed). 
20 Krysan, In the Eye of the Beholder. 
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social category but is invisible or unarticulated as an intersectional subject 
position.” This description captures class-not-race reforms, which formally 
attend to class but not race. Given this discursive and prescriptive posture, 
such policies are prone to privilege constitutional subjects whose economic 
subordination is untethered to their racial identity—that is, poor whites.21 As 
I discuss below, this relative privilege entails material and symbolic 
dimensions. 
A.   Material Consequences: Remedial Gaps  
The material impact of class-not-race reform depends, in large part, on 
existing baselines. At least two baselines deserve note.  
First, we should always ask: “As compared to what?” In the admissions 
context, this translates to: “What is the alternative to class-not-race?” 
Critically, the alternative to class-not-race is not race-not-class. Rather, the 
alternative is almost always class-and-race: admissions regimes that permit 
the formal consideration of a student’s race and class statuses. 
Second, we should ask whether race-blind admissions are race-neutral 
projects. In other words, absent racial affirmative action, do white applicants 
enjoy racial advantages unavailable to similarly situated students of color? As 
I and others have argued, the answer to this latter articulation is yes.22 Across 
income brackets, whiteness confers racial advantages before and during the 
admissions process.23 
Against this backdrop, the racial preferences entailed by class-not-race 
reform come into focus. To begin, class-not-race frameworks baseline to the 
experience and remedial needs of poor whites—whose economic subordination 
is decoupled from their racial status. Whiteness does not immunize poor whites 
from the indignities of poverty. But as Cheryl Harris has observed, “whiteness 
mitigates risk through racial/spatial structures that sort probabilities and 
distribute access and opportunity.” 
 
21 The relative racial privilege enjoyed by poor whites tracks historical expressions of 
racism in this country. See Carbado, Critical What What?, at 1614 (“[H]istorically, 
racism has been bi-directional: It gives to whites (e.g., citizenship) what it takes away 
from or denies to people of color. Framing discrimination in this way helps to reveal 
an uncomfortable truth about race and power: The disempowerment of people of color 
is achieved through the empowerment—material or psychological—of whites.”). 
22 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Footnote 43: Recovering Justice Powell's Anti-Preference 
Framing of Affirmative Action, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1117, 1140 (2019); Sam Erman 
& Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative 
Steps to Promote Meritocracy and Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 307, 
330–39 (2015); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1063, 1064 (2006); Luke Charles 
Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A 
Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 Harv. 
Blackletter L.J. 1 (1994).   
23 See supra note 22. 
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For poor people of color, whose disadvantaged subject position transcends 
class status, class-not-race reforms comprise underinclusive remedial projects. 
This is not to suggest that class consciousness is necessarily inattentive to 
structural barriers confronted by the poor of all races. But as the experience of 
institutions such as the University of California reveals, class-not-race 
policies—in part due to their attenuated nexus to racial subordination—are ill-
equipped to counter white racial advantages embedded within standard 
admissions processes.24 The resulting remedial gaps, in turn, leave behind 
those “on the bottom.” For class-not-race proponents who criticize racial 
affirmative action for purportedly failing to uplift society’s “truly 
disadvantaged,” these gaps should be cause for concern.25  
Class-not-race reforms also privilege poor whites relative to middle- and 
upper-class people of color—who remain subject to racial headwinds 
notwithstanding their class privilege.26 To be sure, this gap is a feature—not a 
bug—of class-not-race reforms. Moreover, it is often justified by the fallacy that 
middle-class status insulates students of color from race-based disadvantage.27  
Notably, this proposition is betrayed by class-not-race proponents 
themselves. A salient example comes from an unexpected source: Students for 
Fair Admissions (SFFA), the organizational plaintiff challenging Harvard 
University’s admissions practices. SFFA alleges that Harvard discriminates 
against Asian Americans to the benefit of white applicants—a claim tied to 
race, not class. SFFA identifies implicit biases as a potential source of the 
alleged disparate treatment. Assuming SFFA is correct, class-not-race reform 
would do little to remedy this harm—nor would it address other advantages 
white applicants enjoy vis-à-vis Asian Americans within, and before, Harvard’s 
admissions process. To the contrary, and as I have argued elsewhere, a more 
responsive remedy would involve a targeted “race-conscious policy capable of 
redressing the specific harm of negative action” that disadvantages Asians 
 
24 See William C. Kidder, How Workable Are Class-Based and Race-Neutral 
Alternatives at Leading American Universities?, 64 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 100, 110–
11 (2016) (“The crux of the problem is that, as noted in many of the earlier studies, 
although there is a meaningful positive correlation between race/ethnicity and 
socioeconomic status, the correlation is not so strong that class can effectively 
substitute for race.”). 
25 See Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2232 (Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the university’s 
desire to admit more “privileged minorities . . . turned the concept of affirmative action 
on its head”). 
26 Devon W. Carbado et al., Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of African 
Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 174, 199 
(2016) (“[B]lack students across class, and not just class-disadvantaged black students, 
experience multiple disadvantages that likely affect their academic performance and 
the overall competitiveness of their admissions files.”).  
27 Though as Professors Luke Harris and Uma Narayan observe, “[n]o one argues that 
middle class status shields white women from the inequities that often result from 
institutional sexism.” Harris & Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of 
Preferential Treatment, at 9.  
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relative to whites.28 Simply put, SFFA’s turn to implicit bias reveals the 
inability of class-not-race policies to counter white racial advantages that 
transcend class privilege. 
B.  Symbolic Consequences: All Poor Lives Matter 
I do not mean to overstate the material benefits that poor whites enjoy 
under class-not-race reforms.29 Given the demographic dynamics of university 
applications and a baseline of class-and-race admissions, the impact on a poor 
white student’s likelihood of admission is likely marginal at best.30 
Even so, a constitutionalized class-not-race preference confers distinct and 
meaningful psychological benefits to poor whites.31 When the Supreme Court 
speaks, its words convey powerful symbolic and “cultural meaning.”32 By 
embracing class-conscious policies and frowning upon race-conscious policies, 
our highest judicial body projects a worldview that either denies racism’s 
enduring presence or deems that reality constitutionally irrelevant or 
insufficient to justify even modest race-conscious remedies.33  
In a sense, the cultural meaning that animates class-not-race tracks that 
embodied by the controversial phrase: “All Lives Matter”—or, tweaked for 
present purposes, “All Poor Lives Matter.” In the abstract, “All Lives Matter” 
constitutes a thin and innocuous platitude. But this phrase does not exist in 
the abstract. It is a direct rebuke to Black Lives Matter—a resounding call to 
name the inherent dignity of Black lives and condemn anti-Black violence and 
anti-Black racism more generally. It is from this contestatory posture and 
societal backdrop that All Lives Matter is cognizable. An otherwise empty 
slogan emerges as a racial project that recenters whiteness by decentering 
Blackness and denying (or shrugging off) anti-Blackness. Moreover, in ways 
 
28 Moreover, a class-not-race regime at Harvard would harm the many Asian-American 
applicants who benefit from Harvard’s current class-and-race policy. 
29 See Harris, Fisher’s Foibles, at 681 (“[W]hiteness is no insurance against the effects 
of structural inequality: Whites who are poor are solicited and summoned to the stage 
to argue against race-conscious remediation, but their specific concerns are rarely if 
ever addressed.”). 
30 See generally Sherick Hughes et al., Causation Fallacy 2.0: Revisiting the Myth and 
Math of Affirmative Action, 30 Educ. Pol’y 63 (2016) (concluding that were all African 
Americans and Latinos removed from Harvard’s 2013 admissions pool, the likelihood 
of white applicants being admitted would increase by 1 percent). 
31 Whiteness’ psychological benefits extend to all whites but are often most meaningful 
for the poor. See Harris, Fisher’s Foibles, at n.104.  
32 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 356 (1987) (proposing a “cultural meaning” 
test that would “evaluate governmental conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message 
to which the culture attaches racial significance”). 
33 Justice Anthony Kennedy is associated with the latter position. See Parents Involved 
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007). Chief Justice 
Roberts, among others, appears to embrace the former. See id. at 748. 
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that parallel equal-protection doctrine’s antipathy for racial classifications, 
replacing the particularized Black with the universal All carries the accusation 
that antiracism—that is, naming race and confronting racism—is the true 
source of racism.  
It requires only a slight lift to map the cultural meaning of All Lives 
Matter onto class-not-race—a constitutional framework that proclaims “All 
Poor Lives Matter.” Class-not-race constitutionalism did not arise in a 
contextual vacuum. To the contrary, it constitutes a direct response to modest 
gains for racial equality that followed the fall of Jim Crow—gains that included 
a range of race-conscious remedies.34 And paralleling the turn from Black Lives 
Matter to All Lives Matter, the Supreme Court’s turn to All Poor Lives Matter 
symbolically centers whiteness by relegating concerns about anti-Blackness to 
the margins of equality law. In effect, the Supreme Court contributes to, and 
reinvests in, the psychological “wages of whiteness.”35 
IV.  Hidden Victors: Wealthy Whites and Elite Institutions 
Up to this point, I have argued that class-not-race constitutionalism 
privileges poor whites. This is only half true—true as to relative advantages 
vis-à-vis people of color. The other half, to which I have gestured, exists in the 
space between poor whites and those at the top: wealthy whites and elite 
institutions—the ultimate beneficiaries of colorblind intersectionality.  
A.  Wealthy Whites 
To begin, class-not-race appeals locate middle-class Blacks (and racial 
classifications) as the admissions barrier for poor whites. In other words, the 
class-not-race frame portrays a zero-sum game that pits poor whites (who 
deserve admission) against “privileged” Blacks (who gain admission only 
through “racial preferences”). This framing distorts the admissions 
competition in two key regards. First, it discursively extracts middle- and 
upper-class whites—who remain overrepresented at many elite institutions—
from the admissions competition.36 Second, it reinforces the contestable 
proposition that admissions regimes are racially neutral projects until 
universities formally consider applicant race. Taken together, these distortions 
reinscribe class-privileged whites “as natural features of the [university] 
landscape—presumed members of a university community admitted on their 
individual ‘merit.’” 
 
34 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1363 (1988). 
35 See Harris, Fisher’s Foibles, at 680 (“The wages of whiteness . . . are an expression 
of the relative value of not being part of a group at the absolute bottom of the social 
and economic hierarchy.”). 
36 For those who would question the overrepresentation characterization, I might ask 
how overrepresentation is not the inevitable outcome of, inter alia, legacy 
preferences—which are untethered to merit, common at elite institutions, and 
disproportionately benefit class-privileged whites.   
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Two noteworthy consequences result. First, these distortions insulate 
from meaningful critique the shallow yet routinize measures of merit that 
systematically exclude talented and otherwise qualified students of color (and 
poor whites). Class-privileged whites, in turn, receive a material benefit: an 
uneven playing field that rewards inherited race and class privilege. Second, 
race consciousness is maligned as a deviation from race-neutrality, not a 
corrective for it. Class-privileged whites, in turn, receive a psychological 
benefit: they can pass through a racially uneven admissions process without 
having to confront the racial preferences they enjoy along the way.37  
B.   Elite Institutions 
Class-not-race constitutionalism also benefits elite institutions to the 
detriment of poor whites and people of color. To begin, universities benefit from 
frames that shield from serious and sustained scrutiny institutional practices 
that reward and reproduce accumulated race and class privilege. This includes 
legacy preferences, an unpopular and antimeritocratic practice that 
disproportionately benefits wealthy whites (via admission) and institutions 
(via donor relations). Legacy preferences call for cross-racial resistance; class-
not-race logic gets in the way.  
But equality law does more than defuse potentially potent allyship. It also 
safeguards elite universities from criticism from the Left. The Harvard 
litigation is demonstrative. As noted above, SFFA claims that Harvard 
discriminates against Asian Americans, perhaps because of implicit biases. In 
the abstract, many progressives would reflexively support—or at least demand 
further inquiry of—such claims (which are plausible given pervasive anti-
Asian stereotypes). But SFFA’s naked goal is to eliminate racial affirmative 
action at Harvard and beyond—not to counter anti-Asian biases that pervade 
society and elite institutions. For this reason, and given affirmative action’s 
legal precarity, the Left has closed ranks around Harvard. This has included 
vigorous denials of anti-Asian bias, even though that claim—even if proven—
would not implicate Harvard’s racial affirmative-action program. As a result, 
and cloaked under the associational halo of civil-rights allies, Harvard avoids 
the scrutiny that ought to follow a plausible claim of “negative action.” 
Finally, class-not-race constitutionalism enables elite institutions to 
portray themselves as racially progressive without taking meaningful steps to 
advance racial justice. The Harvard litigation is again instructive. Juxtaposed 
against SFFA’s openly regressive agenda, Harvard can brand itself as a 
righteous defender of affirmative action and racial equality more broadly. In a 
political moment marked by increasing calls for antiracist reform and 
institutional accountability, brand matters—even for elites like Harvard. And 
yet, this portrayal masks the limited intervention performed by race-
consciousness at Harvard and distracts from Harvard’s reluctance to part with 
 
37 Note the parallels to the earlier discussion about racialized class narratives that 
simultaneously (a) justify Black poverty (the ostensible product of cultural deficiencies, 
not racial discrimination) and (b) legitimate white wealth (the ostensible product of 
neutral market forces, not racial discrimination). 
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institutional practices—such as legacy admits and an overreliance on 
standardized tests—that confer racial (and class) preferences on wealthy 
whites.  
This, in turn, reveals class-not-race constitutionalism’s ultimate 
intersectionality sin: the invisible reinscription of existing hierarchies.  
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